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Abstract
In this paper we explain the basics of Bitcoin protocol and the state of the art of the
main attacks to it. We first present an overview of digital currencies, showing what they
are and the social need they aim to satisfy. We then focus on the main digital currency
up to date, Bitcoin. We treat the basics of the protocol showing what are addresses
and transactions and how they are used in a distributed consensus protocol to build the
blockchain. After that the main part of this paper presents the state of the art of the three
main attacks on the protocol: fraudulent mining techniques, double spending attempts
and deanonymization attacks.
Keywords: Blockchain; Bitcoin; Deanonymization; Fraudulent Mining; Double Spend-
ing
1 Introduction
Internet changed our society starting the so called “digital revolution”. Almost every in-
dividual now can directly connect to any other on the globe allowing for a point-to-point
information exchange or, particularly, commercial interaction. But still, for most users, a
direct point-to-point value exchange (payment) is not possible, and a third party financial
intermediary is required. Entrusting a third party with user funds weakens the user control
and spending freedom, limiting it to have commercial interactions only with parties recog-
nized by the entity. An example of this was the 2010 Wikileaks blockade, when users were
prevented by their financial intermediaries (Bank of America, VISA, MasterCard, PayPal and
Western Union) to spend their funds as they pleased. This episode led to the realization that
centralized currencies controlled on our behalf by third party financial organizations are not
the best way to freely and anonymously exchange value between users in a global distributed
community. This need in the new digital society is met by digital currencies.
The only purpose of a currency is to hold value and allow the exchange of that value
between users. Originally currencies were born to overcome the limits imposed by barter.
Firstly precious commodities (mostly gold) were used to physically represent the value, then
we moved to certificates backed by some precious commodities assets, to finally arrive to fiat
currencies which are certificates without any backing. Gold was used to directly represent
the value owned, gold certificates were backed by gold to indirectly represent the same value.
∗damiano.difrancescomaesa@for.unipi.it
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The certificate value is indirect because it is not determined by the value of the paper and ink
it is printed on, but by the gold amount the certificate represents. Its acceptance is based on
the trust of users in both the emitting entity and the intrinsic value of gold it represents. A
fiat certificate is not backed by any precious commodity value, so its acceptance is only based
on users trust in the emitting entity. This means that we accept fiat currencies just because
we expect every one to accept them as well. So we socially agree they represent some value.
This is similar to what happened thousands of years before with gold, when people where
willing to trade useful things (like food and clothes) for a mostly useless but shiny metal.
Digital currencies make the difference between abstract value (the value the certificate rep-
resents) and material value (the value of the material support the certificate is printed/minted
on) of a certificate explicit. Considering that the certificate abstract and material values are
not correlated, we can as well eliminate the material support obtaining just pure value repre-
sentation. The value represented is now a free information electronically remembered. This
is the same step performed by “electronic money” were value represented by traditional fiat
currencies emitted by central entities (central banks) is electronically stored by third parties.
Electronic money is not a form of digital currency, because it is just traditional currency
digitally processed. That is why a digital currency requires a further step. The currency
should be distributed, and exchanges between users should be direct, without the need of
third party or other users intervention.
To be distributed a digital currency needs to decentralize two operations to the entire
community:
• the minting of new coins;
• the validation of transactions exchanging value.
The problems of performing those two operations are usually solved with cryptography, that
is why some digital currencies are also called “cryptocurrencies”. The whole idea is to shift
the users trust from a human controlled central entity to few reliable cryptographic functions.
It is usually said that with digital currencies every user is its own bank. That is because
each user is the only one in charge of controlling and managing its own funds, it can check
the validity of every other user transaction and can partake in the minting process. Any user
can freely join or leave the community without costs and cannot be banned by others. Only
the right owner can access its own funds and so no funds can be frozen or seized. Usually
digital currencies are also compared to electronic cash, but to behave like cash additional
properties must be fulfilled: non-traceability, non-reversibility, direct exchange. Among those
properties we need to point out that non-traceability and point-to-point exchange together
give anonymity.
The idea of digital currencies is not new, the paper “Blind signatures for untraceable
payments” by David Chaum of 1982 [Chaum 1983] can be considered its manifesto. Chaum
was the first to propose the use of cryptography to validate transactions rather than protect
them. He also founded a commercial society called DigiCash in 1990 to promote this new
cryptography secured currency, but the currency was based on a centralized entity and the
project failed. The first true digital currency came out in 2009, Bitcoin1 [Nakamoto 2008].
1In this paper we will follow the established convention to use “Bitcoin” with a capital ’B’ to represent the
protocol (and so the related technical aspects) and “bitcoin” to represent the currency, the community and
all the aspects related to its real world use.
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Bitcoin has been without doubt the first digital currency to gain wide mass media coverage
and widespread popularity among the broad public of non specialists. Nowadays most of
the academic studies published about digital currencies are about Bitcoin, while outside the
academic community it is seen as the one and only cryptocurrency (the concept of “digital
currency” and “Bitcoin” are often seen as the same). Allowing Bitcoin to gather all the
attention of the broad public about digital currencies is a dangerous mistake. Currently
bitcoin does not fulfill some of the promises of a true digital currency (most of all scalability,
anonymity and decentralization), and so a (maybe inevitable) bitcoin failure could result into
an unjustified lack of trust in the concept of digital currency itself.
As we have already explained, designing digital currencies introduces new problems un-
known in traditional currencies design. The most notable problem is called “Double spend-
ing”. Preventing double spending means preventing users from spending the same funds in
more than one valid transaction. This problem does not exist in a traditional setting because
each user account is controlled by a centralized entity (bank) who has full control over user
funds. It is the central entity the one tasked of issuing transactions, not the user (as happens
with digital currencies), and so there cannot be double spending attempts by the users (at
least not without entity errors). In a distributed scenario each user is tasked with creating its
own transactions and so we need to define a method that allows users to reach a consensus
on which transaction is to be declared valid in presence of multiple conflicting one (to pre-
vent double spending). Bitcoin double spending solution is to allow every user to know all
the previous validated transactions of all users. The entire history is needed because a user
cannot recognize a transaction as a double spending attempt if it does not know the original
transaction2. That means that the entire History of all transactions ever validated is publicly
visible to everyone. This leads to a clear threat to users privacy if identities of users involved
in transactions are not protected enough.
In this paper we focus on Bitcoin because of its dominant position. It is interesting
to verify if the current Bitcoin protocol fulfills its promises as a digital currency, and it
is our intention to focus especially on users privacy protection (without ignoring the other
interesting research topics). Since the very start [Nakamoto 2008] users anonymity was not
Bitcoin main goal. This has brought to a major flaw in the project, which protects user
anonymity only with the use of pseudonymity, with the hope of breaking ownership linking
between addresses and real world identities. Any cryptocurrency who wants to scale to world
acceptance needs strong privacy assurances, which nowadays Bitcoin seems to fail to give.
Our work will concentrate on showing some Bitcoin privacy shortcomings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the basics of the
Bitcoin protocol. We will then focus on three of its main research topics, presenting the state
of the art on fraudulent mining techniques in Section 3, double spending attacks in Section 4
and Bitcoin anonymity in Section 5. In Section 6 we draw our conclusions.
2 Bitcoin Protocol
Bitcoin is the first cryptocurrency to have reached worldwide popularity and adoption but
it is not the first digital currency and its core ideas were already available ten years before
its announcement. The first cryptocurrency attempt is considered to be [Chaum 1983] by
2The transaction whose funds are attempted to be spent for the second time.
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David Chaum, where the author introduces blind signatures to ”allow realization of untrace-
able payments systems which offer improved auditability and control compared to current
systems, while at the same time offering increased personal privacy” [Chaum 1983]. In 1997
the cypherpunk cryptographer Adam Back invented the first proof-of-work called hashcash
[Back 2002, Back 1997] as a DoS countermeasure applied to e-mail spamming. In 1998 Wei
Dai released b-money [Dai 1998], an anonymous digital currency employing proof-of-works,
and at the same time Nick Szabo invented bit-gold [Szabo], which used proof-of-work schemes
to simulate gold digging hardness and had a controlled inflation rate.
Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency and that means that it cannot be seen just as a distributed
protocol. The bitcoin real world community influences its development as much as its original
design principles. Hereafter we will concentrate on the technical topics of the protocol but
studies are also available on the more social aspects of bitcoin. Some papers have studied
the bitcoin community and ecosystem like [Roio 2013, Holdgaard 2014] and [Christin 2013]
where is presented the real world use of bitcoin in the Silk Road dark web marketplace. Even
the FBI has produced its own record about bitcoin [FBI 2012], showing concerns about its
use as payment for illegal activities. More works have been done studying bitcoin economy
[Litecoin 2013, DRAVIS 2014, Iavorschi 2013, WSBI 2014] including financial groups assess-
ments for speculative purposes [Woo et al. 2013, Normand 2014, Sablik 2013]. Works has
also been done to try to explain the bitcoin exchange rate, like in [Luther and Olson 2013]
where a correlation is found between the first 2013 price spike and Cyprus bailout. To-
day the biggest obstacle for serious business ventures in entering the bitcoin economy has
been the lack of a clear legal definition of cryptocurrencies. Some guidelines have been
released by international organizations [BCE 2012, FINCEN 2013, BI 2014, IRS 2014] but
still every jurisdiction apply different legal frameworks and tax rules to digital currencies
[Elwell et al. 2013, WSBI 2014, Regulation 2014, Marian 2013, BBVA 2013].
In the following we will explain the basics of Bitcoin protocol. Do note that there is
no “official” protocol specification available for Bitcoin, so we refer only to the main well
defined basic topics of the protocol as originally presented in [Nakamoto 2008], updated
when necessary with the information available from the official bitcoin wiki [WIKI], bitcoin
improvement proposals [BIP] and official client implementation [BITCOIN CORE].
2.1 Addresses
To enter the bitcoin economy each user only needs to generate a new asymmetric cryptography
key pair. The public key is used to obtain an address to send and receive payments, while
the private key is needed to prove that the user is the true owner of that address. The
private key is used as proof of ownership, because each transaction spending funds contained
in the corresponding public key (address) must be signed with the correct private key to be
accepted. That is the only ownership proof available, so ownership of an address just means
knowing the corresponding private key.
The public key cryptography used by Bitcoin is ECDSA [SEC2 2000], so the private key
is a random 256 bits long number and the corresponding public key is 512 bits long. But
each user does not advertise its public key as it is. It firstly hashes it with SHA-256 [SHA]
to obtain 256 bits on which it applies RIPEM-160 [Preneel 1997, Dobbertin et al. 1996] to
obtain 160 bits. Those bits are encoded with the purpose built Base58Check encoding to
obtain an ASCII representation which is used as the users public address. The Base58Check
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encoding is a purpose built encoding containing a check-sum (the first four bytes of the double
SHA-256 hash of the public address) and avoiding the use of similar characters symbols. The
public address can be advertised and must be know to all those who want to send payments
to it.
We observe now that it is not possible to learn the public key of a user from an address
because the hash functions used are cryptographic and so irreversible. So the address is
used in place of the public key to increase the secret key security because it restrict any
attacker who tries to recover the private key from the public key to a limited time window.
The public key cannot be kept secret forever, because it is necessary to verify a signature
(necessary to make a payment). That is why the public key is attached to any transaction
spending funds from the corresponding address. So an attacker has to wait for this transaction
in order to learn the public key. The private key is necessary to spend the funds contained
in the corresponding address, but the attacker can try to recover it only after a transaction
spending those same funds is revealed. This means that the attack can only be attempted
during the time that passes from when the transaction is announced to when it is validated
(and so the funds are spent and cannot be stolen anymore). The security improvement of
this design can be better appreciated considering the example of post-quantum cryptanalysis
[Bernstein et al. 2009].
The up to date best know quantum algorithm to break cryptographic hash functions is
the Grover search algorithm [Bernstein et al. 2009], which gives a quadratic speedup over
classical algorithms. So this algorithm allows to halve difficulty of hash functions and sym-
metric cryptography breaking in a quantum scenario. A cryptographic hash function re-
quires 2n computations to be inverted and 2n/2 computations to find a collision on clas-
sical computers, so with a quantum computer we will need 2n/2 and 2n/4 computations
respectively, so the problem remains exponentially intractable. The Shor quantum algorithm
[Proos and Zalka 2003] instead allows to solve in polynomial time the discrete logarithm
problem. ECDSA security is based on this problem intractability, so public key elliptic cryp-
tography would not be secure anymore.
As we have seen before, the public key is revealed only when a payment is issued, on
the contrary to receive payments only the address is known. Hash security is reduced but
not compromised by quantum computers (it would be enough to simply increase the size),
so a quantum attacker would not be able to learn the public key from the address. But
once it knows the public key it would be able to find the correct private key in polynomial
time. So if public key were used instead of addresses the protocol would be compromised.
Using addresses allows to restrict the quantum attacker to a limited time frame (dependent
on validation time) to try to find the private key. If the validation time is small enough
the attack would be fruitless because the attacker would always be looking for private keys
protecting funds already spent. So the only effect of a quantum computer would be to force
users to use each address (and so each key pair) only once. We note that even if the validation
time is significant enough to allow the attacker to find the secret key in time it would anyway
be at a disadvantage. Knowing the private key, the attacker could create a different valid
transaction sending the victim funds to an attacker controlled address. But this transaction
will be in conflict with the victim original transaction and so only one of the two would be
validated. Following the protocol rules the first transaction to be relayed on the network
is the one with higher probability of been accepted (the exact probability depends on the
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percentage of validator nodes reached before the other transaction). The time spent from
the attacker to find the private key would result in a propagation advantage of the honest
transaction which will then have a higher chance of being accepted than the fraudulent one.
The attacker could improve its chances by combining the private key discovery with a sybil
attack, to isolate the victim from honest nodes providing an alternative reality to the victim.
The attacker would listen to victim transactions without forwarding them to honest peers,
and forwarding its fraudulent transaction instead once it is ready. More generally relying on
a broken public key algorithm would be pointless per se, so it would be necessary anyway to
use a quantum resistant asymmetric cryptographic scheme (like lattice cryptography).
A side effect of ECDSA security is that if a private key is lost it cannot be recovered. So
any funds stored or sent in the future to the corresponding address would be lost forever. We
also note that creating new ECDSA pairs (and so addresses) is not expensive at all and so
each user can create and use different addresses. This leads to the use of pseudonyms, which
means that each address is a user alias without any kind of information linking it to the user
or other addresses created by the same user. Pseudonymity is the only (weak) anonymity
protection in Bitcoin. To improve transactions anonymity is recommended to create a new
address for every transaction. This is not computationally expensive but it can lead to an
address management problem, if the number of addresses keeps increasing. For users with
high daily transaction volumes (such as exchanges and merchants) issuing a new address
each time would lead to an overwhelming amount of addresses. To simply discard empty old
addresses could be dangerous, because someone could still send payments to them, resulting
in forever lost bitcoins.
2.2 Transactions
A transaction is a funds exchange between addresses. Transactions are multi input, multi-
output, it means that a transaction may have more than one input (address from which
funds are withdrawn) and more than one output (address in which funds are stored). Each
transaction completely transfers funds from the inputs to the outputs (no change is left in
the input addresses). So to keep the change (difference between input sums and the sum we
actually want to pay including fees) a user should include a payer owned address between
the outputs. As we already stated, transactions are the only mean to manage funds, so funds
can be divided or aggregated only by being spent. That is possible because a transaction
involves addresses and not users and every user can have different addresses, so a user can use
a transaction to split, merge or move funds between its own addresses. Transactions aren’t
used only for payments, but also for funds management.
A transaction can also specify a voluntary fee to cover the expenses of the validation
process (that we will explain better later). If the sum of input values exceeds the sum of
output values3 then the exceeding value is considered a voluntary fee paid to the validator.
Paying a fee is optional but it is considered fair practice and it can shorten the validation
time of the transaction.
In a transaction each output can be seen as a couple (bitcoin amount, receiver address).
On the contrary each input specifies where to withdraw the funds, so it does not indicate an
address but instead the previous transaction (actually its hash) where the funds were stored
3If the reverse happens the transaction is obviously invalid.
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in the address now used as an input. Funds are represented by a transaction chain showing
the passage of those funds (split and merged) between addresses, validated at each step by
the previous owner signature. In bitcoin transactions alone specify the entire state of the
system. There is no “coin” exchanged between users, the coins are implicitly represented by
the flow of value through transactions. We can informally state that a “coin” in bitcoin is its
own “history”.
2.3 Consensus
The digital signature guaranties that only the rightful owner can spend its funds, but it does
not prevent it from spending them more than once in different transactions. This is the so
called “double spending problem”. Bitcoin solution is to remember the history of all the past
transactions to determine the actual owner of every fund at each given time. In case of con-
flict between different pending transactions it is necessary to reach a distributed consensus
on which transaction to add to the official history. The history is maintained in a distributed
database of all the valid transactions ever happened. This database is a distributed times-
tamping service because it fixes transactions in discrete time instants, allowing for a partial
chronological ordering. The database is called blockchain because transactions are grouped
in blocks linked in a chainand4. The linking between blocks is achieved by saving the hash of
the header of the previous block in the next block header. To make each block header (and
so its hash) dependent from all transactions contained in that block, in the header is included
the root of the (implicit) merkle tree [Merkle 1987] built from the block transactions hashes.
2.3.1 Proof of Work
It is necessary to reach a consensus to choose which block (and so which transactions) to add
to the chain, because there could be incompatible transactions caused by a double spending
attempt. The idea is to let every user (who wants) vote using its computational power. It
was chosen the one CPU one vote model instead of the one user one vote to protect the
protocol from fake identities (easily deployable in an anonymous P2P network). To create
new users is cheap while to dedicate computational resource is not. So the one CPU one vote
strategy gives proof of a true commitment. A user participating in the validation process
is called miner and the process itself is called mining. Bitcoin uses Prook-of-Work (PoW)
[Dwork and Naor 1992] to implement the voting process through computational power.
Finding a proof-of-work means finding the solution of a computationally intense crypto-
graphic puzzle to prove that some amount of effort was spent. The puzzle used should be
asymmetric, which means that it should be computationally difficult to find a solution, but,
given a solution, should be computationally easy to verify it. It should also allow to adjust
the difficulty (of finding the solution, not of verifying it), and it should be dependent from
some parameter to allow to have different puzzles with the same difficulty. This is needed to
make the solution effort independent of any a priori computation.
In Bitcoin validating a block means finding a hashcash [Back 2002] type proof-of-work
with double SHA-256 of the block header. It means finding a Nonce value so that the double
SHA-256 of the block header is less that an established Target value. The Target value is
automatically updated every 2016 blocks (approximately every two weeks) considering the
4It is actually a tree because of chain forks, as we will see later.
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computational power of the entire network (estimated by the average time passed to validate
a block) in order to keep the average validation rime of a new block around ten minutes.
Solving this type of proof-of-work is equal to a hash partial inversion, but, because the
hash function chosen is cryptographic secure, the best known method is a brute force attack.
This means that the best method is trying different random nonces until one satisfies. So
the average time spent depends only on the computational power (more precisely the hash
power) used. This cryptographic puzzle is a PoW because it is computationally expensive to
solve but constant to verify (requires only one hash computation), the difficulty is adjustable
(changing the target value) and the puzzle is parametric, the parameter being the block
header, so it is not possible to work on the puzzle without knowing the block (no a priori
advantage possible).
Bitcoin PoW is a probabilistic PoW, that means that finding a solution is computationally
expensive on expectation. The randomization is important because otherwise the miner with
the biggest computational power will always find the solution first and so would be the only
one to produce blocks. The randomized PoW instead allows miners to have a probability to
find each block proportional to the hash power dedicated 5.
To encourage mining and repay miners for their computational expenses at each new
block is associated a reward collected by the block finder. The reward consists in the sum of
all fees of the transactions contained in the block, plus a fixed amount of new coins. The fixed
reward starts from 50 BTC and halves over time every 210 000 blocks until it will became zero
at the 6 930 000th block, which is expected to be mined during the year 2140. The decreasing
coin minting is adopted to reflect a deflationary money supply growth.
2.3.2 Distributed Consensus
Reaching consensus in a distributed system in the presence of byzantine faulty entities is a
well studied problem. By byzantine faulty entities we mean we do not make any assumption
on the kind of failure the entity can incur in. This allows us to cover any possible kind
of situation and attacker, for example both random crashes and active malicious behavior
are covered. In [Fischer et al. 1985] was proven that for deterministic asynchronous message
reliable networks cannot exist a consensus protocol resilient in the face of even a single entity
failure.
In [Miller and LaViola 2014] was proven that Bitcoin does not achieve consensus only
with negligible probability when the adversary controls less than half the overall computing
power, under the model of anonymous synchronous network. It was also shown that the
protocol is scalable, in that the running time and total message bits are all independent of
the size of the network, instead depending only on the ratio of faulty processes.
Note that the actual Bitcoin network is not synchronous, but as was shown in [Garay et al. 2014]
it is enough that the network synchronizes much faster relative to the PoW solution rate. It
means that the assumption holds true as long as the messages propagation time (currently in
the order of seconds [Decker and Wattenhofer 2013]) is much smaller than the expected time
to solve a PoW (ten minutes on expectation by design). In [Garay et al. 2014] similar results
as [Miller and LaViola 2014] are shown, showing a proof that a majority of honest miners
will agree on a common prefix of the blockchain, growing in length over time. Even in the
5This is true as long as no single miner controls more than half of the total combined hashing power.
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light of those formal results we should always remember that the use of monetary rewards
introduces new problems in the study of consensus, because this kind of incentive can be seen
differently by different entities and as such is difficult to be formally defined.
2.3.3 Other Kinds of Consensus
Bitcoin SHA-256 PoW is not the only possible consensus mechanism used in cryptocurrencies.
Many altcoins derived from Bitcoin changed the algorithm used or the concept of PoW itself.
Currently mining is performed on ASICS devices purpose built with performances and
power consumption orders of magnitude better than CPUs (and GPUs). This has driven out
occasional miners and have transformed mining in a costly business with a high entrance cost,
menacing decentralization. So there have been proposals to use PoW algorithms difficult to
implement on ASICS devices. The ASIC-resistant algorithms proposed so far are memory
intensive, which means that they require efficient access to big memories, feature lacking in
traditional ASICS devices. The most famous one is “scrypt” [Percival 2009, Percival 2009b,
Percival and Josefsson 2012] used by the most famous altcoin Litecoin [Litecoin a, Litecoin b].
Unfortunately ASIC devices built for scrypt are already available. Also the CPU/GPU min-
ing inefficiency has as useful side effect botnet [Wyke 2012] protection. In [Huang et al. 2014]
a survey of the Bitcoin botnet ecosystem of the time is presented. The paper shows how most
of the botnets were directly participating in well known honest mining pools and how the
increasing difficulty has reduced their profitability.
Another proposal was to try to make the process of solving a PoW to give useful results as
a side effect [King 2013, Primecoin a, Primecoin b]. The problem is to find useful problems
which are characterizable as PoWs, it means they should allow for proportional difficulty
adjustment and no information should be pre-computable.
There have also been proposals to completely substitute the PoW scheme.
The most famous proposal is called Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [Peercoin, King and Nadal 2012,
Houy 2014] and consists in proving to own a certain amount of currency. The idea behind
is to prove to be involved in the currency. This is mostly done by destroying coin-age. The
coin age of a sum of coins is defined as the product of the amount times the time since last
transaction involving that sum. So coin age is directly proportional to the amount of coins
and to the quantity of time those coins were not used. Then a special transaction (containing
a self reward) is created from a user to itself spending those funds and so resetting their coin
age, this transaction is a valid PoS (and may be used to validate a block) with probability
inversely proportional to its coin age. The PoS is computed on only static data except for the
timestamp dependent coin age, so it is independent from the computational power owned.
The main advantage of this approach is that it would be more difficult for an attacker to
gain control of large sums rather than to buy specialized hardware. It would also be more
expensive for it to perform disruptive attacks to the currency, because it would own a lot of
that currency itself and so it would be the first to be damaged by it.
2.4 Forks
Bitcoin is proven to reach an eventual consensus (under the assumptions previously stated),
it means that the network will agree on an ever-growing common prefix of the blockchain,
but the most recent blocks could be different. When an honest miner finds a new block it
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announces it immediately but, due to message propagation latency, another miner currently
unaware of the new block could find a different new valid block itself. So two different but
both valid blocks coexist. In this case we say a “blockchain fork” has occurred. Each miner
then votes on which block to deem valid by starting to look for the next block to add on top of
the chosen one. It means that the miner vote consists in dedicating its computational power
to increase the branch it deems valid. The protocol rule imposes to consider valid only the
longest branch, where “longest” means the one with cumulative higher difficulty, and hence
more computational power (so more votes) dedicated to its creation. Eventually one branch
will grow longer than the other and every honest miner will start looking for new blocks only
on top of that branch, de facto pruning the loosing one. So a temporary consensus is reached.
3 Fraudulent Mining
In the previous section we have explained how Bitcoin needs the majority of the computational
power to be honest to ensure that a consensus is reached. The original idea [Nakamoto 2008]
was that the reward system was an incentive for miners to remain honest. This, however,
does not hold true in the face of two problems:
• It assumes that the BTC awarded are the only value precious to users, while in reality
they alone might not reflect the entire real-world profit.
• It assumes that miners will gain an expected reward proportional to the percentage of
computational power controlled, no matter how the miners behave. That is not true in
the face of fraudulent mining techniques such as block discarding attacks.
3.1 Real World Gains
Miners are not just interested in the number of bitcoins they can gain, but rather in the
real-value of those bitcoins. If a miner was to use known fraudulent techniques to gain more
bitcoins while undermining at the same time the public trust in bitcoin, the exchange rate
would drop, resulting in a smaller real-world gain for the miner. An example of this reasoning
is often used to analyze the likelihood of a 50%+1 attack.
We talk about 50%+1 attack when the majority of the hashing power is controlled by a
single entity. This entity would be in total control of the blockchain because it could decide
to be the only one to add new blocks. To do so it should just ignore blocks published by
other miners. This will lead to frequent forks but the entity branch will always eventually
win because will be always backed by the highest hash power. Being the only one to add
new blocks, the entity would also be the only one to collect rewards and fees, making mining
unprofitable for everyone else, thus driving out miners from the business and hence increasing
the entity computational power percentage even more. Controlling the chain the entity could
also decide which transactions to include in the blocks, for example demanding high enough
fees or just blacklisting some addresses. It could also delete old transactions, voluntary
forking the chain before the block containing them (called history revision attack), allowing
it to perform double spendings. The main argument against this attack is that being the only
one to collect new coins, the controlling entity would also be the one to suffer the most from
a bitcoin exchange rate drop. This means that the entity would be encouraged to behave
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benignly to avoid a drop in public confidence in the protocol that would crash the coins value.
Also the miner would be the most exposed in a bitcoin crash due to the huge investment
sustained to buy the hardware necessary to reach hash power majority which would became
useless and worthless.
Another example of a not-reward driven/compliant strategy would be when the miner
is not driven by the value of bitcoin earned, instead it wants to achieve some other real-
world gain. For example an attacker would like to perform a 50%+1 attack because it
has strong economic interests in a rival cryptocurrency and wants to try to scare users off
bitcoin. It also might want to attack bitcoin just to manipulate the exchange rate, to gain an
economical advance other than just block rewards. An example of those kind of attacks is the
so called “Goldfinger attack” [Kroll et al. 2013]. In this attack the aim of the attacker is to
destroy bitcoin, and it is willing to loose money to reach this goal. In this example the base
assumptions ruling out a 50%+1 attack (anti-profitability and long run losses) would not hold
anymore. This attack is also more effective and difficult to model because it relies on lack of
users trust in the system which is a difficult parameter to model. A Goldfinger attacker could
try to perform the attack even if it controls a huge percentage of the computational power,
but still less than half of it. With the current six confirmation wait to accept transactions an
attacker with 40% of the computational power will pull a successful history revision attack
on a freshly confirmed transaction with a 50% probability, while an attacker with 30% of the
total hash power will succeed in the same attack with a 13% probability. It might not seem
much, also considering the enormous cost necessary to control such high percentages, but a
smart attacker could announce to control the majority of the hash rate and then use some
successful attacks to prove it. If performed right the confusion and disruption created could
be enough to drop the exchange rate, thus making mining less profitable and so driving out
honest miners. This will increase the attacker percentage, further strengthening its position
and the disruption caused until the attack is successful.
3.2 Block Discarding Attack
The reward system was thought [Nakamoto 2008] to be sufficient to encourage miner to
behave honestly, under the assumption that each miner gains were only directly proportional
to its percentage of the total hash power. Unfortunately this assumption does not hold true
in the presence of fraudulent mining techniques, while the contrary holds true instead. Profit
driven miners are rationally incentivized to use a fraudulent mining technique.
The underlying idea behind the fraudulent mining techniques under the family of “block
discarding attack” [Bahack 2013] is to force the honest miners to waste resources trying to
find new block on branches that will later be pruned. To do so, the attacker keeps secret
its found blocks and reveals them only to cancel honest miners efforts. The attacker tries
to build a secret branch longer than the public branch, leaving the honest miners to work
on the public shorter one. This way when the attacker publishes its secret branch it will
be longer and thus replace the public honest one. The aim of the attacker is to make the
honest miners do useless work, thus wasting their computational resources. This way the
total resources dedicated to useful work are lowered and hence the attacker percentage (of
block founds) is artificially raised. The simplest example of this technique is called “selfish
mining” [Eyal and Sirer 2013]. The proposed technique is the following:
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• If the fraudulent miner knows no secret block it starts mining on the public chain
exactly as honest miners do.
• When the secret miner finds a new block it does not publish it and instead it keeps it
secret. Then it starts mining its next block on top of this secret block. This way it can
potentially find a lot of secret blocks and keep building its secret branch.
• When an honest miner finds and publishes a new block, the fraudulent miner can be in
four different situations:
– It has not any secret block. Then it behaves as an honest miner and simply accepts
the new block starting mining on top of it.
– It has only one secret block. Then the rogue miner immediately publishes its
secret block to try to win a network propagation race against the honest block.
Every miner should mine on top of the first block received if it receives two new
different blocks at the same height in the chain. In this case the miner has some
probability (network latency dependent) that the next block found is on top of its
block, in which case the honest miners work is effectively wasted. If a new block
is instead found on top of the honest miner block the fraudulent miner block is
discarded and no reward is earned by it. Note that each honest miner will mine
on top of the first block received, so, depending on network latency, some honest
miners will be helping the fraudulent one, mining on top of its block.
– It has two blocks kept secret. Then the fraudulent miner immediately publishes
its two blocks, creating a fork before the new honest block or adding them to its
previous fork. Its branch now will be the longest and so the new honest block will
be discarded. Then the rogue miner restarts the process from the beginning.
– It has three or more blocks kept secret. The rogue miner immediately publishes
its older block, creating a fork or adding it on top of its previous fork. Now
the fraudulent public branch and the honest one are long the same so the honest
miners will work on top of one of those two, but any block they found will be
useless because the rogue miner already knows at least two more valid blocks on
its fraudulent branch and so it will eventually publish those pruning the honest
ones.
The first observation about this technique is that it is counterintuitive. A miner is sup-
posed to immediately publish new blocks to collect its reward before some other miner pub-
lishes a new block canceling the first miners efforts. The fraudulent miner strategy is the
opposite. It accepts the risk of loosing its certain reward for new blocks hoping to make the
honest miners loose more rewards in useless computations. We also note that the rogue miner
has a smaller hash power percentage than the honest miners combined, so its secret branches
will eventually be surpassed from the honest miners. This is why it never tries to catch up
with a longer branch (which would be probabilistically impossible for it), and as soon as an
honest branch takes over, it starts to mine on top of it.
If we follow the calculations presented in [Eyal and Sirer 2013], calling α the percentage
of computational power controlled by the rogue miner and γ the estimated percentage of
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miners to accept the rogue block in the event of a new block network race, we find that the
relative profit of the fraudulent miner is not α as expected, but
SelfishMinerGain
SelfishMinerGain+HonestMinersGain
=
α(1− α)2(4α+ γ(1− 2α))− α3
1− α(1 + (2− α)α)
This is because the total reward is less than one because some computational power (of
both honest and rogue miners) was wasted on useless computations:
SelfishMinerGain+HonestMinersGain =
α3 − 2α2 − α+ 1
2α3 − 4α2 + 1 < 1
if 0 < α < 1/2
The relative profit could be greater or less then α, depending on α and γ, in particular
SelfishMinerGainPercentage > α iff
1− γ
3− 2γ < α <
1
2
So the selfish mining strategy is convenient if α > (1 − γ)/(3 − 2γ). Not only the relative
profit is greater than the honestly expected one, but it also grows more than linearly when
α increases. Than means that more computational power the rogue miner controls, more
unfairly greater its revenues will be. This leads to a scenario in which the rogue miner
is incentivized to recruit outside miners to increase its profit, and the outside miners are
encouraged to join the rogue mining pool because of the expected higher relative revenues.
So as soon as a fraudulent miner passes the profitability threshold (dependent on γ), it will
start to attract other miners increasing its revenues until the rogue pool reaches the majority
of the hashing power. At this stage the pool controls the chain and it will no longer need to
use the selfish mining technique, nor it will accept new members.
We note that the only thing a fraudulent miner could do to increase the effectiveness of
the attack is to increase γ. This is theoretically possible if the rogue miner succeeds in being
connected directly to all the other miners. In the real network however it is not so simple.
Miners usually access the network through one or more gateway nodes and they try to remain
as hidden as possible. This is because miners node are the most valuable targets for DDOS
attacks. Miners also adopt side channel techniques to communicate between each other to
try to reduce the block propagation latency and hence the amount of resources wasted on
old branches.
Some doubts about the claims in [Eyal and Sirer 2013] are stated in [Courtois and Bahack 2014].
The authors state that the rogue strategy profits are only studied in the presence of only one
rogue pool against an honest majority, no study has been done about more dishonest miners
contemporary adopting fraudulent techniques. Also the idea that the rogue miner should
accept outside miners lured in by higher profits to grow the rogue pool until it reaches a
majority is not so applicable in practice. The first problem is that the expected profit is
theoretically higher than the honest pools, but it can still be irrelevant for real world ap-
plications. Also setting up a pool leaves the attacker open to attacks itself. First of all the
pool members would notice that the blocks are being kept secret and so they could expose
the attacker, also big miners could refuse to partake in a rogue pool scared of the negative
popularity effect it could have on the trust in bitcoin (and so on the exchange rate). Finally,
the new members could perform attacks from the inside of the attacker pool (like the block
withholding attack explained later), to achieve even higher gains than the attacker.
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3.3 Block Withholding Attack
This kind of fraudulent mining techniques is based on the mining pools share payment
method. Bitcoin has seen a huge adoption of miners coalitions called mining pools. A
mining pool is a centralized or distributed infrastructure comprising a set of miners working
on the same PoW. In centralized pools the pool manager is the one in charge of distributing
the revenues among the miners. Miners are not only payed if they find a block, but also for
the effort spent n failed attempts. To keep track of the effective effort spent each miner sends
to the manager not only valid PoWs with the current difficulty but also solutions with lower
difficulties. This proves the manager that the miner is actually working at the POW but was
not lucky enough to find a valid solution. The rewards collected by the pool from valid blocks
mined are divided among all the pool participants proportionally to the computational power
used, as proved by the lower difficulty solutions submitted. It is worth noting that joining a
pool does not increase a miners expected profit, which is still proportional to the miners hash
power (if it is an honest miner). The expected profit is instead slightly lowered because of
the fees taken from the pool operator. The first advantage of joining a pool is a practical one,
because the miner does not have to care about transaction listening and block creation, it
has just to try to solve PoWs provided by the manager. The major economical advantage of
joining a pool is that the expected variance is significantly decreased. The miner is expecting
to be paid a little less regularly rather than collecting one big reward once in a while. The
block withholding attack [Courtois and Bahack 2014] is based on the idea of collecting the
shares participating in the pool without actually increasing the pool computational power.
As we have already seen with block discarding attacks the aim of the attack is to fraud-
ulently increase the rogue miner profit lowering the honest miners profits. This allows the
rogue miner to gain a percentage of profits larger than its hash power percentage. To perform
the attack the miner splits its computational power with two different purposes. The optimal
split is to divide exactly in half the hash power. Half of the power is used from the miner
to honestly mine for new blocks. The other half is divided among the other honest mining
pools. The infiltrated attacker controlled hash power correctly tries to solve PoWs assigned
from the honest managers and sends them the solutions with lower difficulty to collect the
shares but never reveals (withhold) valid blocks found. Note that the found blocks are useless
for the attacker because they are built from honest managers who would be the one to collect
the rewards.
4 Double Spending
We have already explained that the Bitcoin consensus protocol is proven to reach consensus
at any time only on a common prefix of the blockchain, the most recent blocks could be part
of a fork during which no official accepted blocks are defined. During a fork two (or more)
transaction histories exist at the same time, so the same funds could be spent twice, once on
each history. Only one history will eventually prevail, deleting the conflicting transactions
in the pruned branches. But if those transactions were accepted and the real world benefits
had already been gained then a double spending attempt was successful. Bitcoin solution is
to wait a fixed number of “confirmations” before accepting a transaction in the blockchain as
valid. The number of confirmation indicates the minimum number of block the user has to
wait to be mined on top of the block containing the transaction. This number is arbitrary set
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to six by default, but can be increased or decreased depending on the value exchanged by the
transaction [Rosenfeld 2014]. Increasing the number of confirmations to wait increases the
probability that the transaction will be included in the final valid transactions history, but
it also requires the users to wait for more time. In fact on average a new block is validated
every ten minutes, so a six confirmation rule already requires the user to wait one hour, on
average, for every transaction.
This waiting time is too much for a lot of real world payments scenarios, where users can
wait only seconds for a payment. This has brought to the adoption of “fast payments”. A fast
payment is validated using rules which do not consider the blockchain. This obviously makes
fast payments transactions vulnerable to double spending, because the blockchain is the
solution adopted precisely to prevent double spending. The majority of fast payment double
spending prevention techniques are based on a listening period on the network to detect
double spending attempts [Bamert et al. 2013]. If a transaction reaches first the majority of
the miners it will be mined in a block and so no double spending is possible. Because of the
Bitcoin fast message propagation [Decker and Wattenhofer 2013] there is only a limited time
window during which the transaction is still traveling and has not reached all the miners.
This time window is what an attacker should exploit to pull a double spending attempt. The
goal of the attacker is to let the majority of the miners to know its fraudulent transaction
before the honest one without the victim noticing. Due to the gossip message flooding, if
the attacker manages to make the fraudulent transaction to reach the majority of the nodes
it will also reach with high probability the honest node, which will become aware of the
attack. The attacker can use smarter techniques, like for example using the victim neighbors
as a screen to isolate the victim from the network. It can also combine the double spending
attack with more powerful techniques like a sybil attack, to feed to the victim a different fake
reality. The victim can try to protect itself deploying listener nodes in the network or using
a listener service. In the end the attack reduces itself to a stealth race between the honest
and fraudulent transaction. This kind of attack is studied in [Karame et al. 2012].
If the attacker is also a miner it can perform a more powerful attack called “Finney
attack” [Finney]. The attack is more costly because requires the attacker to invest a lot of
computational power in the mining attempt, but it is also much more powerful because it
renders any listening countermeasure useless. The base idea of the attack is that the attacker
tries to mine a valid block containing the fraudulent transaction. As soon as it succeeds,
instead of immediately publish the block as usual it broadcasts the honest transaction instead.
The victim cannot know of the secret block and no conflicting transaction is ever published
on the network, so it will accept the transaction. As soon as the transaction is finalized by
the victim the attacker publishes the secret block, which is valid and so will be accepted by
everyone, rendering the honest transaction invalid and so discarded. The double spending
was successful.
The main advantage of the attacker is that it can first try to mine the block and only
when it manages to mine it, it can launch a double spending attempt, this means that the
miner has no hurry to find the block and so also miners with little percentages of the hash
power can perform the attack. The main problem for the attacker however is that it has to
wait for the victim to finalize the transaction. During the time which passes between the
finding of the block and the victim acceptance some other miner could find a valid block
which will render the secret block invalid. So the attacker is not only risking to see its double
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spending attempt failing, but it is also risking to loose any reward granted from the block.
Usually the block reward is much higher than any sum in a transaction which is accepted as
a fast payment, so the attack would not be economically rational.
5 Deanonymization
While studying bitcoin privacy we should always remember three important properties of the
protocol:
• The entire transaction history is publicly available and persistent in the blockchain.
• Anonymity is enforced only through pseudonymity, which means that each user partake
in the protocol only through an arbitrarily large number of addresses that carry no real-
world information about the user (nor any information between themselves).
• Transactions are broadcasted to the network (mostly) by the creators (gossip), every
user has to create is own transactions, so it is also the first one tasked with informing
the other peers about that new transaction.
To analyze the effective anonymity provided by the protocol we should first formally
define which properties are requested to enforce anonymity. Few works are available on
this topic, the most notable being [Androulaki et al. 2013], where two different properties to
model Bitcoin privacy are presented:
• Activity (address) unlinkability. It refers to the fact that an adversary should not be able
to link two different addresses pertaining to a user of its choice [Androulaki et al. 2013].
• Profile indistinguishability refers to the (in-)ability of an adversary to reconstruct the
profiles of all the users that participate in the blockchain. Profiles, here, consist of
the set of addresses (address-based profiles) or set of transactions (transaction-based
profiles) of Bitcoin users [Androulaki et al. 2013] .
Other efforts on formally defining anonymity properties are mainly present in works
also presenting solutions to enforce those same properties, as for example [Miers et al. 2013,
Ben-Sasson et al. 2014, Danezis et al. 2013].
We will now analyze the state of the art of the main known attacks on bitcoin privacy.
5.1 Network Listening
The most simple form of network listening is to just deploy one or more listeners in the
network recording the message flow. This approach is not a threat to the network and allows
for information propagation studies and basic topology findings [Bitnodes, Donet et al. 2014].
The most cited example is [Decker and Wattenhofer 2013] where transactions and blocks
propagation times are studied and real network data observation are used to prove how block
propagation delay influences blockchain forks.
The goal of network listening based attacks is to link network information with bitcoin
addresses [Koshy et al. 2014, Reid and Harrigan 2013]. Obtaining so we have succeeded in
connecting some real world information to some addresses. We note that by saying “network
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information” we do not just mean an IP. IP addresses are not enough information to cor-
rectly represent a single user when multiple users are behind the same NAT or employ an
anonymization layer like TOR. We need a way to assign to each user a “network signature” to
differentiate users. The most effective proposal was presented in [Biryukov et al. 2014] where
the authors propose to use the “entry nodes set” as signature of each peer. The entry nodes
set is the set of nodes (eight by default) a peer initially establishes its outgoing connections
to. This set is not network dependent and sufficiently random to differentiate peers behind
the same proxy.
The most studied network deanonymization attack is based on the assumption that the
first node in the network to broadcast a new transaction is the creator of that transaction.
The creator of a transaction is also the owner of the input addresses of that transaction,
because in order to create the transaction it had to sign it with the corresponding private
keys.
This assumption is true for the vast majority of transactions, but is not necessary true
for some special transactions. An example is given by CoinJoin transactions [Maxwell 2013],
which are single transactions involving multiple users. In that kind of transactions the inputs
are not owned by a single signer.
In general, automated attacks could always be deceived by active users countermeasures,
so any attack should always try to balance false positives with recall. There are in general
two kind of attacks, the community attack and the targeted attack. In the community attack,
the attacker mostly uses general rules to avoid as much false positives as possible, accepting a
low recall rate, acceptable in the presence of a huge amount of data. The aim of the attacker
is to break the profile indistinguishability property. In the targeted attack the attacker only
considers a relatively small set of addresses and it tries to find at least one linking between one
of those addresses and some real-world information. The attacker is trying to break the weaker
privacy property of address unlinkability, trying to build an address chain of ownership. An
example of attacker for the community point of view could be a researcher trying to gather
general information on the community [Bitnodes, Donet et al. 2014, Meiklejohn et al. 2013,
Biryukov et al. 2014, Miller et al. 2015], while an example of targeted attacker could be a
law enforcement agency who want to find a link between funds involved in illicit activities and
a real world entity [Meiklejohn et al. 2013, Ron and Shamir 2013, Reid and Harrigan 2013].
An example of network listening to link IP with transaction creators (and so addresses)
is presented in [Koshy et al. 2014]. The deployed listener simply tried to connect to ev-
ery network address advertised on the network, keeping alive the connection indefinitely
[Bitnodes, Donet et al. 2014]. The listening period lasted five months from July the 24th
2012 to January the 2nd 2013, with a median of 2678 active connections per hour. The anal-
ysis was based on the standard assumption that the first node to rely a transaction in the
network is its creator, but since no refined technique were employed the simple listener could
not know if the first node it received the transaction from was also the first to release it on the
network or was just propagating it. So the analysis was mainly relying on anomalous relaying
behavior, which for example includes transaction being relayed by a single peer (and not by
others because, for example, are non standard or double spending attempts) or transactions
relayed more than once from the same peer (in the official client a peer sends a transaction
again to a neighbor only if the transaction is not confirmed yet and the peer is the sender or
a recipient in that transaction). In the end the study allowed to associate a probable IP to
17
1162 addresses over four millions transactions collected.
A more refined attack was explained in [Biryukov et al. 2014]. The technique is based on
noticing that a peer is uniquely identified by its entry node set (as explained before). First
of all the attacker tries to find the entry node set for a peer when the peer connects to the
network for the first time. When the peer connects it will forward its own address to its
eight entry nodes. So the attacker remembers the first nodes from whom it has heard of any
new address. Those eight nodes will not be the correct entry node set because of network
latency and random message forwarding, but with high probability there will be a lot of nodes
in common between this attacker estimated set and the actual entry nodes set. Then the
attacker considers the first n (greater than eight) nodes each transaction is first received from
and tries to find an estimated entry nodes set correlated to those n nodes (for example with
at least three nodes in common), in order to associate the transaction with the peer identified
by that set. An attacker can increase the success probability by having a very high number of
connections with each peer (in the paper is suggested to have at least fifty connections with
each full node), because that increases the probability to be chosen as first node to relay a
transaction to. With fifty connections to each peer and three tuple matching as correlation
measure, the experimental results in the bitcoin testnet show a success rate of 60% and in
the real network the success probability is estimated as 11%. We nevertheless remark that
the attack presented is really invasive and disruptive on the real network. Each node keeps
by default a maximum of 125 active connections, so an attacker establishing 50 connections
to each node would consume almost half of the connection slots available, resulting in a quite
heavy DoS on the network. A main advantage of this technique is that it allows for the
first time to differentiate nodes behind NAT or firewalls (or in general nodes not accepting
incoming connections) introducing the entry set recognition.
In [Biryukov et al. 2014] a technique to exclude TOR (or others similar anonymity prox-
ies) nodes from the bitcoin network is also presented. The basic idea is to ban TOR exit
nodes relaying malformed bitcoin data through them to have them blacklisted by honest
nodes as DoS countermeasure. This allows an attacker to prevent honest users to connect
to the bitcoin network via TOR, but the attack is highly detectable. In a subsequent pa-
per [Biryukov and Pustogarov 2014] the same authors show how using Bitcoin over Tor opens
new possibilities for man-in-the-middle and sybil attacks. In [Biryukov and Pustogarov 2014]
the authors also present a smart fingerprinting technique to recognize users, based on attacker
chosen network addresses injected in the peers network addresses lists.
5.1.1 Topology Discovery
A network listener attack always relies on one or more listeners deployed on the live network,
with as many connections to honest peers as possible. The bitcoin network is a pure P2P
network with no topology overlay. This means that the only information nodes have about
the network topology is the set of their neighbors. Nodes also do not exchange directly
any information about their neighbors set, so topology cannot be easily learned. Of course
knowing the topology will highly benefit a network listening attack as well as other kinds of
attacks, so some research has been directed in topology discovery attempts. The two most
promising ideas are presented in [Miller et al. 2015] and [Biryukov et al. 2014].
In [Miller et al. 2015] the authors present a topology discovery technique based on net-
work addresses timestamps. The attacker needs a direct connection to each node it wants
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to find the set of neighbors because it needs to directly send messages to it (known network
addresses list requests). The attacker then asks for as many network addresses known by
the target as possible. The underlying idea is that the protocol rules dictate a node to age
the timestamp of all the nodes it knows about without being connected to them and keep
unchanged (or up to date) the timestamps associated to directly connected nodes. So, by
analyzing discrete two hour differences in timestamps, the attacker can obtain the set of
neighbors of each node. We now should point out that the technique worked at the time
of the paper but is based on protocol rules of the time who may change (and indeed have
changed today). This kind of exploit is based on current implementation rules and not on
immutable protocol principles. The technique presented is a good example as today is not
usable anymore, with version 0.10.1 of the default client the timestamp policy was changed
rendering this attack unusable. In the paper [Miller et al. 2015] is also present a more general
attack to discover mining pool influential nodes, called by the authors decloaking. A mining
pool usually interfaces to the network through one or more gateway nodes, nodes tasked with
collecting transactions and other miners blocks and relay the newly found pool blocks. The
gateway nodes behave as a normal full node and it is important for the pool that they remain
anonymous. This is because if a gateway node is discovered it can be targeted with DDoS
or Sybil attacks, damaging the pool revenues. The technique presented consists in sending
a different marker transaction to each node we are connected to, each transaction must be
conflicting with the others so that only one can be accepted in the chain. Then we check
the blockchain to see which one was validated. Repeating this experiment we can find the
nodes that most often get their marker transactions validated. Those are the nodes closer to
mining pool gateways (or maybe are gateways themselves). This simple method was proven
effective in the paper where is shown how the top 100 influential nodes found accounted for
three quarters of the validated transactions.
In [Biryukov et al. 2014] is present another topology discovery techniques to learn full
nodes (or any other type of node accepting incoming connections) degree and neighbors.
The underlying idea is to send marker addresses (with a timestamp which allows it to travel
only for few hops, hopefully one, under the current relaying rules) to a peer which will then
forward some of them to its neighbors. If then the attacker queries the other nodes (neighbor
candidates) for the marker addresses (the attacker learns most of the node known addresses
and then check how many are markers) it can estimate the probability that they are neighbors
of the target node (based on the number of known marker addresses).
5.1.2 Malleability
A side effect of a listening attack is that it also provides the attacker with all the live in-
formation circulating on the network which are later forgotten and never recorded in the
blockchain. These live data can be very useful to extract more information from the net-
work. An example of this approach is presented in [Decker and Wattenhofer 2014], where
the authors use the live data to estimate the actual amount of malleability attacks in the
network.
When a transaction is created it is signed and the signature is attached to the trans-
action but the signature itself cannot be signed. This means that anyone can modify the
signature representation (just its representation, not its content) without invalidating it,
in this case we say that the transaction was “malleated” [Decker and Wattenhofer 2014,
19
Andrychowicz et al. 2013]. Usually transactions are represented by their hash which is used
as the transaction id. If a user malleates a transaction it will change the transaction hash
and so its id.
Transaction malleability can be used to perform particular kinds of double spending
attempts. We have a double spending attempt because there are two different transactions
released on the network at the same time, so there is a conflict, but an important point
to remember is that the meaning of the two transactions is the same. Only the signature
representation is modified, the addresses and amounts transferred are identical, so whichever
of the two gets validated there will be no difference for the addresses balance involved6. This
double spending attempt becomes dangerous if used against a bad designed software who
relies only on transactions ids. Some third party software checks if a transaction issued by
them is accepted on the blockchain only looking if the corresponding transaction hash is
included in the chain and not the transaction itself. Exploiting this fact, an attack becomes
possible. A fraudulent client can ask the id based service for a payment and then malleate
the newly issued transaction as soon as it is released on the network by the service. The two
transactions will conflict with each other and so only one will be included in the blockchain,
starting a validation-race. If the original transaction is included the attack fails. If, instead,
the malleated transaction is included in the chain then the attacker can complain with the
service that it never received a payment. The service will check the chain for the transaction
id it knows without finding it and so will believe the client. Of course if the service tries
to publish the transaction again, even modified by increasing the fees, it will be always
rejected because it will be seen from the other peers as a double spending attempt. This is
because the funds were already spent in the validated malleated transaction. The attack is
successful because the attacker has been paid while tricking the service in believing it has not.
Eventually the service will emit a new transaction spending new funds to pay the fraudulent
user who will so be paid twice (or even more times if it succeeds in malleating also this new
transaction). The entire attack is based on the service kept balance history being different
from the globally blockchain stored history, so the service does not know of payments already
finalized by the network.
A big scandal arose when the biggest bitcoin exchange, Mt.Gox [MtGox 2014], declared
bankruptcy bringing a malleability attack as motivation for the users funds loss. In
[Decker and Wattenhofer 2014] a single highly connected listener was deployed in the bitcoin
network to collect transactions live data, looking for malleability attacks. The results show
how the Mt.Gox claims look difficult to believe as only 1.811,58 BTC were involved in mal-
leability attacks from the analysis start until the service lock down (between 1/01/2013 and
7/02/2014). This example clearly explains the huge opportunities provided by live network
data analysis.
5.2 Blockchain Deanonymization Attack
The most studied kind of deanonymization attacks is the blockchain analysis attack. The
aim of this attack is to break the profile indistinguishability property by aggregating Bitcoin
addresses in clusters, each representing a single user, using the historical information stored
in the blockchain. The attack is usually strengthened by also using external information to
6The addresses and amounts are signed and so cannot be modified without invalidating the signature. The
only parts of the transaction not signed, and so modifiable, are the signatures themselves.
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link each address cluster with some real world information to deanonymize users. The attack
can be divided in three steps:
• In the first step the attacker passively parses the blockchain to obtain a transaction
graph. The transaction graph is a graph where each node represents an address used
in the blockchain and each oriented edge connecting two nodes represents an atomic
transactions involving those two addresses and can be weighted (for example with the
transaction timestamp and value). With atomic transaction we mean that we split each
multi-input multi-output transaction in more atomic transactions, each connecting one
of the inputs with one of the outputs, so that each output has exactly one ingoing
atomic transaction.
• In the second step the attacker performs a heuristic rules based clustering applied to
the previous graph to obtain a so called “users graph”. In this new graph the nodes
are now sets of addresses all controlled by same user.
• The final step is the users graph deanonymization using external information to obtain
an identities graph. The techniques used to perform the real world identity-user linking
are various but always based on external information gathering [Reid and Harrigan 2013].
This can be done crawling the web to search for Bitcoin addresses used in posts or do-
nations signatures. Of course voluntary disclosed information are less reliable and so
should be accordingly weighted. A more reliable method is to directly interact with
services and well known economic parties to learn their addresses through economic
exchanges, as performed in [Meiklejohn et al. 2013]. This step can also be combined
with a network listening attack to use the listening results to perform identity linking.
Is worth noting that this step can also refine the results obtained at the previous step,
further collapsing together user clusters.
The intermediate step is the most important and difficult one of the three. Addresses
clustering is the step that breaks address unlinkability and hence should be carefully planned.
The clustering is based on heuristic rules i.e. rules based on bitcoin users behavior and
common practice observation as well as technical constraints. These rules are time dependent
and not general and can lead to a high rate of false positives or negatives if not correctly
tuned. Of course it is preferable to decrease false positives at the expense of an increase in false
negatives to avoid flawed final results, but false positives are inevitable. Basing ourselves on
general rules to model users behavior we inevitably misinterpret some uncommon use cases.
This is why in the literature only two heuristic rules are always used and generally accepted.
5.2.1 Multiple Inputs Heuristic
The first heuristic proposed [Ron and Shamir 2013, Meiklejohn et al. 2013, Reid and Harrigan 2013,
Androulaki et al. 2013, Ober et al. 2013] and the one considered the safest and most used is
called “multiple inputs”. The heuristic rule is the following:
“in a multi-inputs transaction all the input addresses belong to the same user”
Every transaction must be signed for every input, it means that to sign the transaction
the private key of each input should be known. This implies that the signer knows all the
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private keys and hence it is the owner of all the input addresses. This first simple heuristic
rule has been used with success in the past but it is no longer valid for all transactions. A
new countermeasure has been designed to trick the “multi inputs” heuristic.
The first effective countermeasure proposed was CoinJoin [Maxwell 2013] which underly-
ing idea is for a set of users to meet and collectively create a single transaction using their
addresses. First several users agree to take part in a new transaction creation through a
meet-up server or decentralized consensus. Then they agree on fixed sum input transactions
to be joined in a single big transaction. This means that each user uses one input address
with a fixed sum and a single new output address to collect its payment to itself. The trans-
action must be signed by all the users to be valid, so each user can abort the transaction
at any time. This prevents thefts but leaves the protocol open to DoS attempts. An at-
tacker can join as many transactions as possible and then always abort refusing to sign them.
Another problem is that each information about other participants is shared among all the
users creating a transaction together. This means that “internal linkability” is possible and
other information, such as IP addresses, might be leaked. An improved protocol providing
internal unlinkability called CoinShuﬄe [Ruffing et al. 2014] has been proposed, but it also
suffers from DoS attacks, because it allows to detect a party that aborts but cannot prevent
fraudulent parties from aborting. We also remark that the privacy offered by the common
transaction is limited to the number of users taking part in that transaction, so we talk about
k-anonymity. The anonymity set size can be increased chaining together more joined transac-
tions, to allow the anonymity set to include all users partaking in all the joined transactions
in the chain.
5.2.2 Change Address Heuristic
The second most used heuristic rule [Meiklejohn et al. 2013, Reid and Harrigan 2013, Androulaki et al. 2013]
is called “change address heuristic”. The heuristic rule is the following:
“the change address belongs to the same user of the input addresses”
The rule looks simple but the main problem is to correctly identify which address is
actually the change address. This means that the rule yields a lot of false positives and so must
be refined to decrease them (at the expense of the recall rate). The refinements are heuristic
sub-rules themselves based on users behavior and current wallets software implementation.
Some of these sub-rules adopted in [Meiklejohn et al. 2013] are presented here. The address
c is a change address in transaction t if and only if:
• t is not a coinbase transaction
• | outputs(t) |> 1
• inputs(t) ∩ outputs(t) = ∅ (no self change)
• there is no address already labeled as change address or belonging to the inputs owner
in outputs(t)
• it is the first time c appears in the blockchain and there is no other address in outputs(t)
satisfying this condition
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5.2.3 Countermeasures
We have already seen CoinJoin [Maxwell 2013] and CoinShuﬄe [Ruffing et al. 2014] proposals
to trick the heuristic driven clustering attack, but more general techniques are used to try to
protect against blockchain analysis. All of the techniques proposed try to break the ownership
tracking among transactions.
The most simple techniques used are called obfuscation techniques [Ron and Shamir 2013]
and consist in scrambling funds among user controlled addresses to confuse the attacker. The
used techniques rely on well known randomized patterns, the most notable being splits and
aggregations, peeling chains, and binary trees. All those techniques succeed only in creating
confusion, without effectively breaking the funds ownership and so can be easily detected by a
motivated attacker [Ron and Shamir 2013, Meiklejohn et al. 2013, Reid and Harrigan 2013].
A better countermeasure is to use a mixer. A mixer is a third party entity which collects
standard-sized payments from customers directed to a set of input addresses and pays back
the same clients at random times in the future using funds stored in addresses not linked to
any of the input addresses by any transaction. This effectively breaks ownership tracking but
leaves the user exposed to thefts from the third party mixer, which needs to be trusted. The
mixer also knows the internal linking of users, allowing internal linkability, and users need to
pay a fee to use the service. Laundering the funds through a chain of different mixers will
increase the anonymity but also the cost and the risk of thefts. A review of mixing services is
presented in [Moser 2013] where is shown as the BitLaundry mixing service does not actually
break ownership tracking.
We should also note that also benign attacks and positive results are possible through
deanonymization attacks. An example is theft tracking. In bitcoin transactions are irre-
versible and so theft can be publicly reported but cannot be reversed. The stolen funds can
anyway be blocked if honest users refuse to accept them as payments. Of course strong evi-
dences need to be presented in order to avoid DoS attacks with fake thefts. The deanonymiza-
tion techniques allow also to keep track of the stolen funds preventing the thief from laun-
dering them through obfuscation techniques [Meiklejohn et al. 2013].
5.3 SPV
To use the explained protocol a user needs to know the entire blockchain (or its compressed
form). For occasional users who use bitcoin only to pay small sums through smart phones,
downloading the entire blockchain is impossible. To cope with light weight users the Simplified
Payment Verification (SPV) was defined [Nakamoto 2008].
We firstly note that the chain is used to check the validity of transactions received from
other users and not to create new transactions, so a SPV user will create and broadcast
transactions as everyone else.
When an SPV user needs to check for a transaction validity (containing for example a
payment to it) it sends to full nodes a special SPV addresses request containing the addresses
the SPV user is interested in. When the full nodes learn new transactions containing the
requested addresses they forward the transaction to the user with the merkle tree of the
block containing the transaction and the header of all the blocks until a certain depth in the
blockchain. The merkle tree allows the user to check that the transaction is really included
in that block, while the block headers allow the user to check that the block is part of the
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longest chain. It is worth noting that the block headers are constant in size and much smaller
than the entire block (81 bytes against a variable size up to 1 MB). We also note that the
user cannot check the transaction validity because it does not know the other transactions.
For example it cannot check that the input used in the transaction are really present in the
chain. But the user knows that the block containing that transaction is part of the longest
chain and this means that the majority of miners have worked on top of that block and so
they deemed the transaction valid.
Of course the fact that the SPV user lets the full nodes know which addresses it is
interested in is a clear privacy problem. To avoid direct disclosure the SPV nodes send the
full nodes only a bloom filter with a desired false positive rate, this allows the full nodes
to check if an address matches with the filter without directly knowing the user addresses.
Unfortunately a lot of information is leaked by those bloom filters, resulting in a big privacy
issue for SPV users. In [Gervais 2014] the author shows that a lot of addresses can be
recovered from one filter of a user with a little number of addresses. They also prove that
an attacker can easily discover which different filters are created by the same user and that
an attacker can learn a lot of addresses of a user if it knows at least two different filters of
the same user. The SPV deanonymization can be combined with the previous techniques to
strengthen the obtained results.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown the core rules of Bitcoin protocol. We have also presented the
state of the art on three main attacks on Bitcoin. First we showed the main fraudulent mining
techniques employable by fraudulent miners to unfairly gain an advantage in the mining race.
We then showed attacks aimed at attempting double spending attempts. Finally we presented
the main threats to users privacy in Bitcoin.
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